The Emergence of Unrecognized States in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
S. Markedonov

 The emergence of unrecognized entities resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union paralleled ethno-political confrontations. In 1992, a ceasefire was enforced in the Georgian-Ossetian and Moldovan-Transnistrian regions. In 1994, cease-fires were also successfully enforced in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and in Chechnya (with a second deal coming in 1996). The cease-fire agreements established a new status quo and the termination of large-scale military confrontation; although violations of ceasefires and continued individual actions took place, they were not the result of overt political decisions. Conflicts, as well as the status of unrecognized entities, became “frozen.” In some cases, the military-political balance of forces determined these conditions (e.g., Nagorno-Karabakh), in other situations socio-psychological and legal reasoning complemented the political-military factors (e.g., Chechnya, with its “delayed status” for five years until 2001).

However, the “freeze” could not last, since the “losers” in these situations were interested in changing the existing balance of forces. They sought to accumulate enough resources to change the status quo, with varying degrees of success (Georgia is in the worst situation in this context while Azerbaijan is in a better position). Periodically, Russia attempted to change the situation on the ground, particularly in Chechnya from 1999 to 2000. Georgia did similar things in Abkhazia from 1998 to 2001, and in South Ossetia from 2004 to 2008. Azerbaijan’s leaders, in contrast, focused on changing the format for achieving a diplomatic resolution, making good progress by excluding Stepanakert from negotiations between Yerevan and Baku. Meanwhile, over the last two decades, according to Russian political analyst Dmitri Trenin, “unrecognized republics actually received all the trappings of statehood—constitutions and governments as well as police and military forces.”1 Now any fruitful expert discussion about secession and territorial integrity is impossible without referring to the issue of unrecognized states. By recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 1 Dmitry Trenin. 2002. “Predisloviye k Russkomu izdaniyu” [The Foreword to the Russian edition] in Bruno Coppieters, Federalizm i conflict na Kavkaze [Federalism and conflict in the Caucasus]. Moscow: Moscow Carnegie Endowment: 4. The Unrecognized States of Eurasia 191 August 2008, Russia created a precedent for redefining Soviet-era interrepublic borders and establishing new interstate boundaries. Thus, the process of ethnic self-determination accompanying the Soviet collapse is not finished. This stage in history will not be complete until there is successful conflict resolution and all new entities are recognized as legitimate. Meanwhile, without the completion of this process, it is impossible to speak about the sustainability of post-Soviet countries, their real independence, and the transition to democracy.
Ref:
https://www2.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/GWASHU_DEMO_20_2/774457151U376032/774457151U376032.pdf